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Abstract
The environment in which a population evolves can have a crucial impact on selection.
We study evolutionary dynamics in finite populations of fixed size in a changing environment.
The population dynamics are driven by birth and death events. The rates of these events
may vary in time depending on the state of the environment, which follows an independent
Markov process. We develop a general theory for the fixation probability of a mutant in a
population of wild-types, and for mean unconditional and conditional fixation times. We
apply our theory to evolutionary games for which the payoff structure varies in time. The
mutant can exploit the environmental noise; a dynamic environment that switches between
two states can lead to a probability of fixation that is higher than in any of the individual
environmental states. We provide an intuitive interpretation of this surprising effect. We
also investigate stationary distributions when mutations are present in the dynamics. In this
regime, we find two approximations of the stationary measure. One works well for rapid
switching, the other for slowly fluctuating environments.
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21 Introduction
Evolutionary dynamics describes the change of populations over time subject to spontaneous
mutation, selection, and other random events [1, 2]. Different phenotypes in the population
can emerge spontaneously by mutation, i.e. through errors during reproduction of wild-types.
In many cases, wild-type and mutant individuals are characterised by heritable differences in
behavioural traits or strategies [2]. Selection acts on different phenotypes and changes the
population composition. Changes in the state of the environment can alter these selective
pressures over time.
Time-varying environments are relevant in the evolution of bacterial populations subject to en-
vironment modulations by a host [3, 4], or varying antibiotic stress. An illustrative example
is the evolution of normal (wild-type) cells and resistant ‘persister’ cells (mutant). This was
examined by Kussell et al. [5], where periods of antibiosis were turned on and off. During times
of antibiotic stress the growth rate of normal cells was reduced, but the resistant cells sustain
population levels. In addition, Acar et al. [6] provided further experimental evidence supporting
the deterministic model used in [5]. More complicated studies of dynamics in switching envi-
ronments rely on cells ‘sensing’ the environment [7] and on the history or information of the
environment during a cell’s life [8, 9]. These examples illustrate that the assumption of an in-
teraction structure independent of time is not always realistic. At the same time it is largely an
open question how complex interactions between phenotypes together with spontaneous changes
in the environment influence the evolutionary dynamics.
The interactions of phenotypes in a population can be formalised in an evolutionary game
[10, 11]. Such games can be used to describe conflict over food or territory, cheating in resource
allocation, as well as interactions between variants of a gene [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. In an evo-
lutionary normal-form game each individual can be associated with one out of a finite set of
strategies. A payoff matrix quantifies the reward received by a given individual when it interacts
with another individual [11].
The dynamics of populations interacting in such a game are often described by deterministic
replicator equations or similar differential equations [10, 17, 18]. While deterministic dynamics
are useful to understand the action of selection per se, more interesting phenomena arise when
stochastic effects are taken into account. A stochastic approach is appropriate – often even
strictly required – to understand the impact of fluctuations in finite populations [19, 20]. De-
terministic approaches fail to capture effects such as fixation and extinction, or the convergence
to a stationary distribution in systems with mutation [21, 22, 23, 24, 25].
3There is an increasing body of literature on stochastic evolutionary games. For example, an-
alytical results for the probabilities of a single mutant to reach fixation have been obtained
[26, 27, 28, 29]. However, most of this existing work focusses on games played in a fixed envi-
ronment; the underlying payoff matrix itself remains unchanged in time. This assumption may
not be appropriate in cases where external factors influence the environment.
External fluctuations in evolutionary games have been previously introduced by adding extrinsic
noise to continuous model parameters [30], or by letting strategy space itself vary in time [31].
Environmental variability has also been the subject of investigation in predator-prey models
[32, 33].
In this article we explore different theoretical approaches that allow calculations of fixation prob-
abilities and mean fixation times of a rare mutation, under fluctuating environmental conditions.
We use a generic birth-death framework, as described in section 2, and our results thus apply
to a wide class of population dynamics. In section 3 the theory is developed for an environment
which can transition between an arbitrary number of discrete states, and we expand on the
two-environment scenario in section 4. To illustrate our theoretical results we study the fixation
properties in an evolutionary game that stochastically switches between a coexistence game and
a coordination game in section 5. We determine environmental conditions under which the suc-
cess of a rare invading mutant is maximal. This is seen to occur at a non-trivial combination
of switching rates. For the case in which mutations occur during the dynamics, as described in
section 6, we explore how the stationary distribution of the population changes in fluctuating
environments. We derive approximations for the stationary distribution, valid for a large range
of switching rates. We summarise our findings in section 7 and put them into context.
2 Mathematical Model
We seek to model evolutionary dynamics in finite populations of two species that are subject
to environmental changes. The changes in the environment are such that at any given point
in time, the system can be in one of a finite set of environmental states. The state that the
environment is in determines the details of the birth and death dynamics. We focus on two cases:
first, in the absence of mutations in the dynamics, we derive laws to predict the probability and
mean time of the fixation of a mutant. Fixation describes the event in which mutants take over
the population as opposed to going extinct. Fixation or extinction are the only two outcomes
of dynamics of a rare mutant in a finite population [34]. In figure 1 we show a basic sketch of
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Figure 1. A population undergoes a one-step birth-death process, such that given the population is in state i,
in one time-step it may transition to i− 1 or i+ 1, or remain at i. The states i = 0 and i = N are absorbing in
both environments (no arrows out of these states). The transition probabilities (birth/death rates) are dependent
on the state of the environment, indicated by solid vs. dashed arrows in environments σ and σ′, respectively.
The environment switches from state σ to σ′ with probability µσ→σ′ in any one time-step. The quantity φi,σ
represents the probability of fixation, as discussed in section 3. (Online version in colour.)
this scenario in which the two monomorphic states of the population are absorbing. Second,
we study the case when mutations occur in the dynamics. There are then no absorbing states.
Instead, the dynamics converges to a stationary distribution.
2.1 Birth-death dynamics
We consider populations consisting of a fixed number of N individuals. Each individual can
be of one of two types, A or B, which we refer to as ‘mutant’ and ‘wild-type’, respectively.
The population is well mixed; every individual can interact with any other individual. The
state of the population is fully characterised by the number, i, of individuals of type A. The
remaining N − i individuals are of type B. We furthermore assume that at any one time the
environment can be in one of Ω discrete states, labelled σ ∈ Λ, where Λ is the space of states
of the environment (|Λ| = Ω). Hence the state of the entire system at any time is given by the
pair (i, σ).
The discrete-time birth-death dynamics of the population for a given environment, σ, is then
specified by the transition probabilities ω+i,σ and ω
−
i,σ of a one-step process. Specifically, if the
system is in state (i, σ) the population transitions to state i + 1 in the next time step with
probability ω+i,σ. Similarly the state of the population in the next time step is i − 1 with
5probability ω−i,σ. These transitions are shown as black arrows in figure 1. With probability
1 − (ω+i,σ + ω−i,σ) the population remains in state i. We always assume that ω±i,σ ≥ 0 and
ω+i,σ + ω
−
i,σ ≤ 1 for all (i, σ).
With the exception of section 6 we will always assume that the states i = 0 (all-B) and i = N
(all-A) are absorbing (ω+0,σ = 0 and ω
−
N,σ = 0 for all σ ∈ Λ). In the absence of further mutation
events a type, once absent, can never be re-introduced. If mutations are present in the dynamics,
then the states i = 0 and i = N are no longer absorbing and the system converges to a unique,
non-trivial stationary state. We consider this case in section 6.
2.2 Fluctuating environment
In our approach the environment evolves from one state to another independently of the state
of the population. This simplification still captures a wide array of natural scenarios. In the
discrete-time setup we take the dynamics of the environment as a simple Markov chain, described
by the transition matrix µ = (µσ→σ′) of size Ω×Ω. The entry µσ→σ′ represents the probability
that the environment changes to state σ′ in the next time-step, if it is currently in state σ, as
shown in figure 1. The matrix µ is a stochastic matrix,
∑
σ′ µσ→σ′ = 1 for all σ ∈ Λ.
A switch of the environment effectively modifies the birth-death dynamics in the population.
We do not specify the exact type of interaction at this point, but keep the rates ω±i,σ general.
3 Fixation probability and time for a general birth-death pro-
cess in a fluctuating environment
3.1 Fixation probability
Let us first consider a discrete-time evolutionary process. If the system is in state (i, σ) at a
given time, it may transition to 3Ω possible states in any one time-step. These are given by
(i, σ′), (i+ 1, σ′) and (i− 1, σ′), where σ′ ∈ Λ can be any of the Ω states of the environment. If
6we write R(i,σ)→(j,σ′) for the probability of a transition from (i, σ) to (j, σ′), we have
R(i,σ)→(i+1,σ′) = µσ→σ′ω+i,σ
R(i,σ)→(i−1,σ′) = µσ→σ′ω−i,σ
R(i,σ)→(i,σ′) = µσ→σ′(1− ω+i,σ − ω−i,σ). (3.1)
No transitions from (i, σ) to (j, σ′) can occur when |i − j| > 1. In this setup the birth-death
probabilities are determined by the state of the environment at the beginning of the discrete
time-step.
The fixation probability, φi,σ, is the probability that the system ends up in the absorbing state
with N individuals of type A, conditioned on initial state (i, σ). The probability of fixation of
a single mutant, φ1,σ, is of particular interest [21]. It is briefly illustrated in figure 1. In our
scenario with switching between Ω environmental states, following the lines of Refs. [2, 28, 35],
the following balance equation for the fixation probabilities can be found
φi,σ =
∑
σ′∈Λ
µσ→σ′
[
ω+i,σφi+1,σ′ + ω
−
i,σφi−1,σ′ + (1− ω+i,σ − ω−i,σ)φi,σ′
]
. (3.2)
This is to be solved along with the boundary conditions φ0,σ = 0 and φN,σ = 1 for all σ ∈ Λ.
To obtain a formal solution, we introduce ψi,σ =
∑
σ′ µσ→σ′φi,σ′ , or in matrix form ψi = µ · φi.
The vectors ψ
i
and φ
i
each have Ω components. The boundary conditions φ0,σ = 0 and φN,σ = 1
translate into ψ0,σ = 0 and ψN,σ = 1 for all σ ∈ Λ. With this notation we have
φi,σ = ω
+
i,σ(ψi+1,σ − ψi,σ)− ω−i,σ(ψi,σ − ψi−1,σ) + ψi,σ. (3.3)
Using φ
i
= µ−1 · ψ
i
, we obtain
ψi+1,σ − ψi,σ = γi,σ (ψi,σ − ψi−1,σ) + 1
ω+i,σ
[
(µ−1 · ψ
i
)σ − ψi,σ
]
, (3.4)
where γi,σ = ω
−
i,σ/ω
+
i,σ. We stress that the calculation of fixation probabilities and mean fixation
times using this formalism requires the matrix µ to be invertible. We comment on this further
in the context of a specific example in Sec. 4.
To keep the notation compact we define the variable υi,σ = ψi,σ − ψi−1,σ. Using ψ0,σ = 0, we
7have ψi,σ =
∑i
j=1 υj,σ. With this notation we can write equation (3.4) in the following form
υi+1,σ = γi,συi,σ +
1
ω+i,σ
(µ−1 − I) · i∑
j=1
υj

σ
, (3.5)
where I is the Ω × Ω identity matrix. This relation expresses the vector υi+1 in terms of the
vectors υ1, υ2, . . . , υi. We can therefore express all vectors υi (i=2, . . . , N) in terms of υ1. The
constraint
∑N
i=1 υi = ψN = (1, . . . , 1)
T then determines υ1 self-consistently. We note that the
resulting set of equations is linear in the set {υ1,σ}. Hence a solution can be obtained in closed
form, in principle. In practice one inverts the linear system using one of the standard algebraic
manipulation packages. Once υ1 has been found, the other components υi, with i = 2, . . . , N ,
can be computed via equation (3.5). One then uses φ
i
= µ−1 ·∑ij=1 υj to find the fixation
probabilities starting with i individuals of type A in environment σ, {φi,σ}.
We note here that algebraically inverting the linear system (3.5) when N is large is difficult
due to the very large number of terms in the corresponding expressions. Thus, at present, this
theory is limited computationally to relatively small N .
In the case of a single environment, Ω = 1, the matrix µ is simply the 1 × 1 identity matrix,
and equation (3.5) simplifies to the well-known result for discrete-time birth-death processes
[2, 28, 35].
3.2 Unconditional fixation time
We write ti,σ for the expected number of time-steps taken to reach any one of the two absorbing
states, given that the system is started in state (i, σ). These fulfil the boundary conditions
t0,σ = tN,σ = 0. With these definitions we find the following relation
ti,σ =
∑
σ′∈Λ
µσ→σ′
[
ω+i,σti+1,σ′ + ω
−
i,σti−1,σ′ + (1− ω+i,σ − ω−i,σ)ti,σ′
]
+ 1. (3.6)
Introducing the variable ξi,σ =
∑
σ′ µσ→σ′ti,σ′ , we have
ti,σ = ω
+
i,σ(ξi+1,σ − ξi,σ)− ω−i,σ(ξi,σ − ξi−1,σ) + ξi,σ + 1, (3.7)
8and with the notation νi,σ = ξi,σ − ξi−1,σ we arrive at
νi+1,σ = γi,σνi,σ +
1
ω+i,σ
(µ−1 − I) · i∑
j=1
νj

σ
− 1
ω+i,σ
. (3.8)
This relation allows one to express all vectors νi (i = 2, . . . , N) in terms of ν1. The constraint∑N
i=1 νi = (0, . . . , 0)
T then determines ν1, and the mean unconditional fixation times are com-
puted using ti = µ
−1 ·∑ij=1 νj .
3.3 Conditional fixation time
We write tAi,σ for the mean fixation time conditioned on absorption in the all-A state, given that
the system is initially in state (i, σ). To find this conditional fixation time, we proceed along
similar lines as before. Introducing the variable θi,σ = φi,σt
A
i,σ, which has boundary conditions
θ0,σ = θN,σ = 0, the following balance equation can be found,
θi,σ =
∑
σ′∈Λ
µσ→σ′
[
ω+i,σθi+1,σ′ + ω
−
i,σθi−1,σ′ + (1− ω+i,σ − ω−i,σ)θi,σ′
]
+ φi,σ. (3.9)
We note that equation (3.6) and equation (3.9) appear to be very similar, but the difference is
more than just a global pre-factor φi,σ; each term in the expression has different indices i and
σ.
Introducing the variable ζi,σ =
∑
σ′ µσ→σ′θi,σ′ , we have
θi,σ = ω
+
i,σ(ζi+1,σ − ζi,σ)− ω−i,σ(ζi,σ − ζi−1,σ) + ζi,σ + φi,σ, (3.10)
and introducing ηi,σ = ζi,σ − ζi−1,σ we arrive at
ηi+1,σ = γi,σηi,σ +
1
ω+i,σ
(µ−1 − I) · i∑
j=1
η
j

σ
− 1
ω+i,σ
φi,σ. (3.11)
The set {θi,σ} can then be found using an approach similar to the one described above. Results
for the mean conditional fixation time can then be obtained using tAi,σ = θi,σ/φi,σ.
93.4 Continuous-time model
In any of the elementary time steps of the above discrete-time model, both the state of the
population (i) and the state of the environment (σ) can change. We next consider a continuous-
time setup. There are two types of discrete events that may occur at any time: (i) the state of
the environment may change, or (ii) a birth-death event may occur. The rate (per unit time)
with which a transition from state σ to state σ′ occurs is denoted by mσ→σ′ . The occurrence of
these events is independent of the state of the population. The rate with which a birth-death
event of the type i→ i+ 1 occurs is W+i,σ, if the environment is in state σ. The rate with which
i→ i− 1 occurs is W−i,σ. We write Pi,σ(t) for the probability to find the system in state (i, σ) at
time t, and find the master equation
∂tPi,σ(t) = W
+
i−1,σPi−1,σ(t)−W+i,σPi,σ(t) +W−i+1,σPi+1,σ(t)−W−i,σPi,σ(t)
+
∑
σ′
[
mσ′→σPi,σ′(t)−mσ→σ′Pi,σ(t)
]
. (3.12)
Fixation probability
We write Qj,σ′;i,σ(t) for the probability to find the system in state (j, σ
′) a period of time t after
it has been started in state (i, σ). The corresponding backward master equation [36, 37] reads
∂tQj,σ′;i,σ(t) = W
+
i,σ
[
Qj,σ′;i+1,σ(t)−Qj,σ′;i,σ(t)
]
+W−i,σ
[
Qj,σ′;i−1,σ(t)−Qj,σ′;i,σ(t)
]
+
∑
σ′′
mσ→σ′′
[
Qj,σ′;i,σ′′(t)−Qj,σ′;i,σ(t)
]
. (3.13)
We define ϕi,σ(t) =
∑
σ′ QN,σ′;i,σ(t) as the probability that the system has reached fixation in the
all-A state a period of time t after the dynamics has been started in state (i, σ). This includes
fixation before time t. By setting j = N and summing over σ′ in equation (3.13) we obtain
∂tϕi,σ(t) = W
+
i,σ
[
ϕi+1,σ(t)− ϕi,σ(t)
]
+W−i,σ
[
ϕi−1,σ(t)− ϕi,σ(t)
]
+
∑
σ′′
mσ→σ′′
[
ϕi,σ′′(t)− ϕi,σ(t)
]
. (3.14)
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The fixation probabilities are found as φi,σ = limt→∞ ϕi,σ(t), and they can be obtained by setting
the time derivative in equation (3.14) to zero. Introducing yi,σ = φi,σ − φi−1,σ, one finds
yi+1,σ = gi,σyi,σ +
1
W+i,σ
∑
σ′
mσ→σ′
 i∑
j=1
(yj,σ − yj,σ′)
 , (3.15)
with gi,σ = W
−
i,σ/W
+
i,σ and where we have used φ0,σ = 0 to write φi,σ =
∑i
j=1 yj,σ. For the case
of a single environment the second term on the right-hand side vanishes and one recovers again
the well known results in single environments [2, 28, 38]. Equation (3.15) has the same general
structure as equation (3.5). Keeping in mind that φN,σ = 1, the fixation probabilities can hence
be found by applying the approach outlined in section 3.1.
Fixation times
Calculating the mean fixation time using a diffusion approximation [34, 36, 37, 39] is not ap-
propriate for our model. The environmental switching process has no continuum limit. Instead
we work with the backward master equation (3.13) and adapt the calculation outlined by Antal
and Scheuring [21].
We introduce ϑi,σ(t) =
∑
σ′
[
Q0,σ′;i,σ(t) +QN,σ′;i,σ(t)
]
, the probability that the system has
reached fixation in either of the two absorbing states a period of time t after being started
in (i, σ). Again this includes fixation before t. We then have ρi,σ(t) = ∂tϑi,σ(t) for the proba-
bility density to reach fixation exactly at time t. From the backward master equation (3.13) we
find
∂tρi,σ(t) = W
+
i,σ
[
ρi+1,σ(t)− ρi,σ(t)
]
+W−i,σ
[
ρi−1,σ(t)− ρi,σ(t)
]
+
∑
σ′
mσ→σ′
[
ρi,σ′(t)− ρi,σ(t)
]
. (3.16)
The mean unconditional fixation time is then found via ti,σ =
∫∞
0 dt tρi,σ(t), from which we find
− 1 = W+i,σ
[
ti+1,σ − ti,σ
]
+W−i,σ
[
ti−1,σ − ti,σ
]
+
∑
σ′
mσ→σ′
[
ti,σ′ − ti,σ
]
. (3.17)
A similar iterative equation can be found for the mean fixation time conditioned on absorption
in the all-A state. The only difference is the integral of ρAi,σ(t) = ∂t
[∑
σ′ QN,σ′;i,σ(t)
]
is given by
11
the fixation probability φi,σ, and that t
A
i,σ = φ
−1
i,σ
∫∞
0 dt tρ
A
i,σ(t). The mean conditional fixation
times, tAi,σ, therefore fulfil the relation
− φi,σ = W+i,σ
[
φi+1,σt
A
i+1,σ − φi,σtAi,σ
]
+W−i,σ
[
φi−1,σtAi−1,σ − φi,σtAi,σ
]
+
∑
σ′
mσ→σ′
[
φi,σ′t
A
i,σ′ − φi,σtAi,σ
]
. (3.18)
Structurally, equations (3.17) and (3.18) are of the same form as the corresponding equations for
the discrete-time model, and so they can be solved using an analogous procedure. In continuous
time, however, the solution procedure no longer relies on the invertibility of the matrix m
of switching rates between the states of the environment. This is because we have split up
the birth-death dynamics and the changes of the environment into separate events that occur
successively.
4 Switching between two environments
We now focus on the case of environments which can be in one of two possible states, i.e. Ω = 2.
We label the two states as σ = ±1 (Λ = {+1,−1}). We focus on the discrete-time scenario.
The matrix µ can then be written as
µ =
(
1− p+ p+
p− 1− p−
)
, (4.1)
where the quantity pσ (σ ∈ {+1,−1}) is the probability that the state of the environment
switches to −σ in a given time-step if it is in state σ at the beginning of this step. We recall
that our theoretical results require the inversion of µ. Excluding the case when ∆ = det µ =
1− p+ − p− vanishes, this inversion can be carried out straightforwardly,
µ =
1
∆
(
1− p− −p+
−p− 1− p+
)
. (4.2)
For the case ∆ = 0, we have verified that there is no anomalous behaviour of simulation results.
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4.1 Fixation probability and times
The general result of equation (3.5) now reduces to the recursion
υi+1,σ = γi,συi,σ +
1
ω+i,σ
pσ
∆
i∑
j=1
(υj,σ − υj,−σ). (4.3)
The fixation probability is obtained from the set {vi,σ} via
φi,σ =
i∑
j=1
[
1− p−σ
∆
υj,σ − pσ
∆
υj,−σ
]
. (4.4)
Similarly, equations (3.8) and (3.11) reduce to
νi+1,σ = γi,σνi,σ +
1
ω+i,σ
pσ
∆
i∑
j=1
(νj,σ − νj,−σ)− 1
ω+i,σ
(4.5)
and
ηi+1,σ = γi,σηi,σ +
1
ω+i,σ
pσ
∆
i∑
j=1
(ηj,σ − ηj,−σ)− 1
ω+i,σ
φi,σ (4.6)
respectively. The mean unconditional and conditional fixation times are then found as
ti,σ =
i∑
j=1
[
1− p−σ
∆
νj,σ − pσ
∆
νj,−σ
]
, (4.7)
tAi,σ =
1
φi,σ
i∑
j=1
[
1− p−σ
∆
ηj,σ − pσ
∆
ηj,−σ
]
. (4.8)
4.2 Effective description for fast switching
The environmental change is fast if the environmental states are short-lived, i.e. much shorter
than the mean fixation time in either environment. Then we expect the population dynamics to
be controlled by a set of effective transition probabilities, i.e. weighted averages of the original
transition probabilities in the different environmental states. The weights are given by the
fraction of time spent in each environmental state. As the dynamics of σ follows a simple a
telegraph process [36], the asymptotic fraction of time spent in the state σ is p−σ/(pσ + p−σ)
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for σ ∈ {−1,+1}. Using this, the effective transition probabilities are given by
ω±i,eff =
p−
p+ + p−
ω±i,+ +
p+
p+ + p−
ω±i,−. (4.9)
We note that pσ is the probability that in a given time-step the environment switches from state
σ to −σ. Hence the time spent in state σ decreases with increasing pσ if p−σ is held fixed.
We anticipate that expression (4.9) can formally be derived by introducing a relative scaling
parameter between the switching probabilities and the birth-death probabilities, and by then
taking a suitable limit in which the time scales of both processes are widely separated. We do
not explore this route further here.
In this approximation the dynamics of the population are mapped to a simple birth-death process
on the set i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} with absorbing states i = 0 and i = N . For such processes explicit
expressions for the fixation probabilities and mean fixation times are known [2, 28, 35]. In the
fast-switching limit we propose the following approximation for the fixation probability,
φi,eff =
1 +
∑i−1
k=1
∏k
j=1 γj,eff
1 +
∑N−1
k=1
∏k
j=1 γj,eff
. (4.10)
We have here written γi,eff = ω
−
i,eff/ω
+
i,eff . The corresponding approximations for the mean
unconditional and conditional fixation times of a single mutant are
t1,eff = φ
eff
1
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
1
ω+l,eff
k∏
m=l+1
γm,eff , (4.11)
tA1,eff =
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
φl,eff
ω+l,eff
k∏
m=l+1
γm,eff , (4.12)
respectively. These expressions exactly describe the fixation properties of a birth-death system
with the effective transition probabilities; the nature of our approximation is to assume that the
birth-death process in quickly changing environments can be described by the effective transition
probabilities in equation (4.9).
Finally we note that this theory is independent of the invertibility of the switching matrix µ.
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5 Fixation in fluctuating two-player two-strategy games
5.1 Evolutionary games
As a direct application of the general theory we have developed, we now consider evolutionary
game dynamics in well-mixed, finite populations. Any of the N individuals can be of one of two
types, A or B. We limit the discussion to two-player games, but the extension to multi-player
games (e.g. [25, 40, 41]) is straightforward.
At any point in time the environment is in one of two discrete states (σ ∈ {+1,−1}). This state
fluctuates in time as specified above. The interaction between individuals is characterised by
the payoff matrix
A B
A aσ bσ
B cσ dσ.
(5.1)
The subscript σ indicates the dependence on the environment. The matrix focuses on the
column player: A type-A individual encountering another of its kind receives aσ, and it receives
bσ when interacting with a type-B individual. In turn, an individual of type B interacting with
an individual of type A obtains cσ, and dσ is the payoff for each individual if they are both of
type B.
If the environment is in state σ, and if there are i individuals of type A in the population and
N − i individuals of type B, the expected payoffs for each type of player are
piσA(i) =
i− 1
N − 1aσ +
N − i
N − 1bσ,
piσB(i) =
i
N − 1cσ +
N − i− 1
N − 1 dσ. (5.2)
The reproductive fitness of any individual is a function of the individual’s payoff in the evolu-
tionary game. We use an exponential mapping [42, 43],
fσA(i) = e
βpiσA(i),
fσB(i) = e
βpiσB(i). (5.3)
This is a common natural choice in which fitness is never negative and monotonically increasing
with payoff. Any other functional form of the payoff-to-fitness mapping with these two properties
would be equally appropriate. The constant parameter β > 0 is the so-called intensity of
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selection. Based on this definition of fitness we model the evolutionary dynamics by the update
rules of the Moran process [34, 44], which has been widely used in evolutionary game theory
[2, 28, 45]. The Moran process represents a simple birth-death process in which the population
size remains constant, and by construction it has absorbing states at i = 0 and i = N . In
a discrete-time setting, the frequency-dependent Moran process is specified by the transition
probabilities [46]
ω+i,σ =
i(N − i)
N2
fσA(i)
f
σ
(i)
, ω−i,σ =
i(N − i)
N2
fσB(i)
f
σ
(i)
, (5.4)
where f
σ
(i) = [ifσA(i) + (N − i)fσB(i)]/N is the average fitness in the population. We note that
the framework of the previous section can be applied to microscopic evolutionary dynamics other
than the Moran process. This includes, for example, pairwise comparison processes [47, 48], or
cases with constant selection in any one environment.
5.2 Switching between coexistence and coordination games
Rare mutations can introduce a previously absent strategy into the population. Typically there
is only one individual of this novel type initially. We say that B is the resident type, and that
A is the invading mutant type. All results in this section are based on the initial condition
i = 1. We chose aσ = dσ = 1 for the payoff matrix. The type of game is then determined by the
off-diagonal terms. We chose bσ = 1+σb and cσ = 1+σc, where b, c are real-valued parameters.
Thus we have the payoff matrix
A B
A 1 1 + σb
B 1 + σc 1.
(5.5)
Our parametrisation does not span the entire space of all 2× 2 games, but it covers some of the
most common types (see below).
There exist three general types of two player-two strategy evolutionary games. First, for the
coexistence game bσ > 1 and cσ > 1, selection drives the population away from the absorbing
boundaries. Second, for bσ < 1 and cσ < 1, the population dynamics exhibits bi-stability. This
is also known as a coordination game; selection drives the population towards the monomorphic
states. In both cases there exists an internal point in frequency space for which the direction
of selection changes its sign, i.e. at which the gradient of selection is zero. This point can be
calculated by solving ω+i,σ = ω
−
i,σ (or equivalently f
σ
A(i) = f
σ
B(i)) for i, and broadly speaking it is
determined by the relative magnitudes of b and c. Third, for bσ > 1, cσ < 1 (or bσ < 1, cσ > 1)
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Figure 2. (a) A sample trajectory (time series) of the fraction of individuals of type A. White background
corresponds to the environment being in the σ = +1 coexistence state, while the shaded background corresponds
to the σ = −1 coordination state. Dashed line is the location of the point at which selection balances, which is the
same in both states of the environment. (b) Gradient of selection in the σ = +1 coexistence state (ω+i,+ − ω−i,+).
Solid circle shows location of the point of selection balance, and arrows indicate the direction and magnitude of
flow towards this point. (c) Gradient of selection in the σ = −1 coordination state (ω+i,− − ω−i,−). Empty circle
shows location of the point of selection balance, and arrows indicate the direction and magnitude of flow away
from this point. For the realisation in panel (a) and the selection bias shown in (b) and (c), the payoff matrix
elements are aσ = dσ = 1, bσ = 1 + 0.5σ and cσ = 1 + 0.9σ, the system size is N = 100, the selection intensity is
β = 1, and the switching probabilities are p+ = 10
−3 and p− = 10−4. (Online version in colour.)
type A (or type B) always has the higher fitness irrespective of the composition of the population.
This type is then always favoured by selection, which never changes direction.
For the remainder of this article we focus on switching between coexistence and coordination
games. More precisely we choose b > 0 and c > 0 in (5.5). The coexistence game corresponds
to σ = +1 and the coordination game to σ = −1.
5.3 Results
Sample trajectory of the dynamics
In figure 2(a) we show a sample trajectory of a simulation in which a single mutant reaches
fixation. The gradient of selection, ω+i,σ − ω−i,σ, for the two games is shown in figures 2(b) and
2(c). During periods when the environment is in the coexistence state (light background) the
population fluctuates about the selection-balance point (dashed line), and during periods when
the environment is in the coordination state (shaded background) the population is driven away
from the selection-balance point. In the final period in the coordination state the mutant is
driven to fixation.
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Figure 3. (a) Fixation probability of a single mutant as a function of switching probabilities. The main panel
shows simulation results (symbols; crosses correspond to σ(0) = +1 and circles to σ(0) = −1) for fixed p− = 0.01,
along with the exact theoretical results (solid lines) from equation (4.4), and the effective theoretical result (dashed
line) of equation (4.10). Inset panels show fixation probabilities from equation (4.4) over all combinations of p+
and p−. Left inset panel: initial condition σ(0) = +1. Right inset panel: σ(0) = −1. The horizontal lines
correspond to the data shown in the main panel. (b) Mean conditional fixation time (in generations) of a single
mutant as a function of switching probabilities. The main panel shows simulation results, as described above, for
fixed p− = 0.01, along with the exact theoretical results (solid lines) of equation (4.8), and the effective theoretical
result (dashed line) of equation (4.12). Inset panels show mean conditional fixation times from equation (4.8) over
all combinations of p+ and p−. Left inset panel: initial condition σ(0) = +1. Right inset panel: initial condition
σ(0) = −1. The horizontal lines correspond to the data shown in the main panel. The payoff matrix elements are
aσ = dσ = 1, bσ = 1 + 0.5σ and cσ = 1 + 0.9σ, the system size is N = 50, and the selection intensity is β = 0.5.
(Online version in colour.)
Fixation probability and conditional fixation time
In figure 3 we show the effect of switching the environment on the fixation dynamics. We choose
c > b > 0. By equating the reaction probabilities (i.e., setting ω+i,σ = ω
−
i,σ), or equivalently
equating the expected payoffs in equation (5.2), and looking at leading order terms in N , the
gradient of selection is seen to change sign at i∗/N ≈ b/(b + c) < 1/2. This point is closer to
the extinction state of the mutant (i = 0) than to the fixation state (i = N). We next describe
the key observations we make from these results, before we turn to their interpretation.
Fixation probability (figure 3(a)):
The fixation probability in this example depends non-trivially on the rates with which the
environment switches states; we find an optimal combination of switching rates, p+ ' p−, for
which fixation of a single mutant is most likely. The fixation probability is dependent on the
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initial state of the environment for pσ . 0.1.
Fixation time (figure 3(b)):
Mean conditional fixation times show very little dependence on the initial state of the environ-
ment. The fixation time is small for p+ > p− when the environment is found mostly in the
coordination game, and large when the environment is mostly in the coexistence state.
Validity of the theoretical approach:
As seen in both panels of figure 3 the theoretical predictions of equations (4.4) and (4.8), indi-
cated by solid lines, are in convincing agreement with simulation data. Theoretical results from
the model with effective transition rates (section 4.2) reproduce the simulation data qualitatively.
Quantitative agreement is obtained in the limit of large switching rates, but unsurprisingly, there
are systematic deviations when switching is slow.
Interpretation
We now proceed and give an intuitive explanation for the observed effects.
Mean conditional fixation time is reduced as more time is spent in coordination environment:
The behaviour of the fixation time can intuitively be understood from the deterministic gradient
of selection of the two games (figure 2(b) and 2(c)). If fixation happens, it will generally be
quicker in the coordination game than in the coexistence game [21, 49]. This is due to the
adverse selection bias in the coordination game at low mutant numbers (see figure 2(c)). The
more time the system spends in this region of adverse selection the less likely it is for the mutant
to reach fixation. Thus if fixation happens in a coordination game then it happens fast. In the
coexistence game on the other hand the direction of selection is towards the balance point, as
shown in figure 2(b). The system can ‘afford’ to spend significant time in the region of small
mutant numbers and still reach fixation eventually even after repeated excursions throughout
frequency space. There is thus no need for fixation to occur quickly, and conditional fixation
times can be long.
These observations make it plausible that the mean conditional fixation time will generally
decrease when less time is spent in the coexistence game, which is exactly what we find in
figure 3(b). We have tested other choices of the parameters b and c for which the two games
are a coexistence game and a coordination game, and we find that the behaviour of the mean
conditional fixation times is robust under these changes.
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(b) Value of p+ at which φ1,σ is maximal given p− = 0.01 as a function of b and c. Remaining parameters are
β = 0.5 and N = 50. (Online version in colour.)
Mean conditional fixation time is largely independent of the initial state of the environment:
Systems started in the coordination environment will tend to reach extinction relatively quickly
due to initial adverse selection, unless the environment switches to the coexistence state early
on. Thus the sample of runs that reach fixation started from the coordination-game environment
will be dominated by runs in which the environment switches soon after the start of the run.
Then we expect that the value of the mean conditional fixation time is close to the one obtained
when starting in the coexistence game.
Dependence of fixation probability on initial state of the environment:
The data in figure 3(a) show that initiating the dynamics in the coexistence game favours
fixation of the mutants for p+ . 0.1 (when p− = 0.01 is fixed), however above this threshold
the initial state of the environment has relatively little effect. The reason for this is as follows.
When starting in the coordination game, selection pushes the mutant towards extinction. Hence
fixation is more likely if the initial state is the coexistence fitness landscape. Above p+ ' 0.1, the
switching process of the environment is too fast for the initial condition to have any significant
effect on the population dynamics. It is this regime in which we expect the effective description
(section 4.2) to approximate the system well. This is indeed confirmed in figure 3, the theoretical
prediction of the effective theory, equation (4.10), agrees well with our simulation results in this
fast-switching region.
Behaviour of fixation probability depends on location of the selection-balance point:
If the environment is fixed to the coexistence-game state, fixation is more likely the closer the
point of selection balance is to the fixated state, see figure 4(a). The location of this balance
point is approximated by i∗/N = 1/(1 + c/b), and so the fixation probability increases as c/b
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is decreased. In a fixed coordination-game environment the reverse is the case. The range of
adverse selection is to the left of the balance point, and so fixation is less likely the closer the
point of selection balance is to the fixated state.
For b  c, i.e. a selection-bias point close to i = 0, we therefore expect that the fixation
probability will increase the more time is spent in the coordination-game environment, i.e. φ1,σ
is an increasing function of the probability p+ with which the system leaves the σ = +1 state
(coexistence game). This is indeed what we find in simulations (data not shown). For b  c,
i.e. i∗ close to i = N , the reverse is the case. Fixation is more likely in the coexistence game
(σ = +1), and the fixation probability is hence a decreasing function of p+ at fixed p−. Although
we do not show the data here, this is again confirmed in simulations.
For b ≈ c the situation is less clear. The fixation probability will be comparable in both games
if the environment is frozen. Two effects here conspire to produce a non-trivial outcome:
(i) Consider the case in which the system is mostly in the coordination-game state, i.e. p+ 
p−. It is plausible that an occasional switch to a coexistence game will make fixation
more likely than in a constant coordination game. This is because the coexistence-game
environment pushes the system away from extinction at low mutant numbers. In the
regime of p+  p− we thus expect the fixation probability to increase as p+ is lowered. In
other words, φ1,σ(p+) is a decreasing function at large p+.
(ii) Similarly, if the system is mostly in the coexistence-game environment (p+  p−), short
periods of time in the coordination game can make fixation more likely. This is because
selection at large mutant numbers is directed towards fixation in the coordination game.
At p+  p− we expect φ1,σ to be an increasing function of p+.
These two effects taken together generate a maximum of the fixation probability at intermediate
values of p+ ≈ p−, which is exactly what we find in figure 3(a). We would like to stress that
the effect (i) is only present provided the selection-balance point is not too close to the extinct
state. The phenomenon discussed under (ii) is only present if the selection-balance point is
not too close to the fixated state. If the balance point is located too close to either boundary
the corresponding effect will be suppressed and the remaining effect dominates. One then finds
monotonically increasing or decreasing dependences φ1,σ(p+).
To confirm our picture we varied the payoff parameters b and c, and find the value of p+ that
maximises fixation probability for a given p− = 0.01, as a function of b and c in figure 4(b).
The point of selection balance is approximately 1/(1 + c/b) (up to system-size corrections). The
21
presence of diagonal structures in figure 4(b) shows that the behaviour of the fixation probability
is dependent on the location of the selection-balance point. If this point is close to the fixation
state i = N (b  c, bottom-right in figure 4(b)), then the fixation probability is maximal for
vanishing p+. If this point is close to the extinction state (b c, top-left in figure 4(b)), then the
fixation probability is maximal for large p+. For intermediate locations of the selection balance
point (b ≈ c) fixation is maximised at a non-trivial combination of environment states.
The features observed in figure 3, i.e. the peak in the fixation probability and shape of the
mean conditional fixation time as a function of p+, are found to be robust when the system size
is increased. Fixation probabilities generally decrease with system size but the observed peak
becomes sharper. The mean conditional fixation times in a frozen coexistence environment scale
exponentially with N , whereas they scale as the logarithm of N in the coordination environment
[50]. We observe these scalings in our system, with the mean conditional fixation time increasing
exponentially with N for small p+, and increasing sub-linearly with N for large p+.
6 Mutation-selection equilibria under fluctuating environments
6.1 Mutations and stationary distributions
We now consider systems with mutations occurring during the dynamics. This removes the
possibility of fixation and extinction. The combination of mutation, selection, and noise can
lead to non-trivial stationary states. We introduce mutation by modifying the discrete-time
transition probabilities of equation (5.4) and now use
ωˆ+i,σ = (1− u)
i(N − i)
N2
fσA(i)
f
σ
(i)
+ u
(N − i)2
N2
, ωˆ−i,σ = (1− u)
i(N − i)
N2
fσB(i)
f
σ
(i)
+ u
i2
N2
, (6.1)
where u  1 is the mutation rate. The transition probabilities ωˆ+0,σ = ωˆ−N,σ = u are now
non-zero, and so the states i = 0 and i = N are no longer absorbing.
The stationary probability ρi,σ of finding the system in state (i, σ) (i = 0, 1, . . . , N , σ ∈ Λ) is
obtained as the solution of the balance equation
ρi,σ =
∑
σ′∈Λ
µσ′→σ
[
ωˆ+i−1,σ′ρi−1,σ′ + ωˆ
−
i+1,σ′ρi+1,σ′ + (1− ωˆ+i,σ′ − ωˆ+i,σ′)ρi,σ′
]
. (6.2)
This equation is of the form ρi,σ =
∑
σ′
∑
j Rˆ(j,σ′)→(i,σ)ρj,σ′ , and it is solved by finding the
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eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue λ = 1 of the linear operator Rˆ. In principle this
can be done analytically, but we use standard numerical packages to find the eigenvector. The
stationary distribution for the state of the population is found by summing over all states of the
environment, ρi =
∑
σ ρi,σ. This solution is exact.
If the environment states are long-lived, the population will relax to the stationary state of the
current environment before the next switching event. With this, one might expect that the
overall stationary distribution is the weighted average of the stationary distributions one would
obtain in the respective stationary environments. The stationary distribution in a single fixed
environment, σ, can be found explicitly as
ρ
(1)
i,σ = Γi,σρ
(1)
0,σ, Γi,σ =
i∏
j=1
ωˆ+j−1,σ
ωˆ−j,σ
, ρ
(1)
0,σ =
(
1 +
N∑
i=1
Γi,σ
)−1
. (6.3)
This can be derived for example from equation (6.2) assuming that the transition matrix of
the environment is diagonal, µσ→σ′ = δσσ′ , where δσσ′ is the Kronecker delta. The average
stationary distribution over many slow-switching environments can then be written as
ρi =
∑
σ′∈Λ
ρσ′ρ
(1)
i,σ′ , (6.4)
where ρσ is the probability that the environment is in state σ.
Alternatively, if the switching probabilities per time-step are large one might expect the sta-
tionary distribution to be approximated by the distribution found in a system controlled by the
effective transition rates, ωˆ±i,eff . These are obtained as described in section 4.2, with suitable
modifications to account for mutation. The resulting stationary distribution is found as
ρi,eff = Γi,effρ0,eff , Γi,eff =
i∏
j=1
ωˆ+j−1,eff
ωˆ−j,eff
, ρ0,eff =
(
1 +
N∑
i=1
Γi,eff
)−1
. (6.5)
The distributions ρi and ρi,eff are both approximations. To evaluate the validity of the assump-
tions leading to these approximations we compute the distance
d(t) =
1
2
N∑
i=0
∣∣ρi − P simi (t)∣∣ , (6.6)
and similarly for ρi,eff , where P
sim
i (t) is distribution of the population at time t obtained from
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Figure 5. (a) The stationary distributions in the single-environment coexistence game ρ
(1)
i,+ (dotted line) and co-
ordination game ρ
(1)
i,− (dashed lines) calculated from equation (6.3), along with the exact solution ρi [equation (6.2),
evaluated numerically] and the ‘average’ ρi [equation (6.4)] and ‘effective’ ρi,eff [equation (6.5)] approximate sta-
tionary solutions (solid lines). These distributions are for switching probabilities p+ = p− = 10−3. (b) The
time-averaged distance [equation (6.6)] between distributions obtained from an ensemble of 5 × 105 simulations,
Qi(t), and the analytic stationary distributions for symmetric switching, p+ = p−. Simulations run for T = 2×103
generations. Inset plots show the time-averaged distances over all switching-parameter space. Left inset panel
shows the distance to the ‘averaged’ stationary solution [equation (6.4)], and right inset panel shows the distance
to the ‘effective’ stationary solution [equation (6.5)]. The payoff matrix elements are aσ = dσ = 1, bσ = 1 + 0.5σ
and cσ = 1 + 0.9σ, the system size is N = 50, the selection intensity is β = 0.5, and the mutation probability is
u = 0.02. (Online version in colour.)
simulations. To confirm our analytical approach we also compute the distance of simulation
data from the exact solution for ρi. We allow the system to run for a fixed time T , and we
then use the time-averaged distance, d = (2/T )
∫ T
T/2 d(t) dt to evaluate the accuracy of the
approximations. We ignore the first half of the time series to remove remnants of the initial
condition. We note that the time T , measured in generations, is equivalent to NT simulation
time-steps and is chosen to be long enough such that the system relaxes to the stationary state
before measurements start at time T/2.
6.2 Results
We present results for the two-world scenario, where the environment switches between a coex-
istence game and a coordination game as described above. The stationary distribution of the
environmental state is given by ρσ=+1 = p−/(p+ + p−) and ρσ=−1 = p+/(p+ + p−).
The stationary distributions of the population for the fixed environments (calculated using
equation (6.3)) are shown in figure 5(a). In a constant coexistence game (σ = +1) the stationary
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distribution is peaked about the point at which the gradient of selection changes sign, and in a
fixed coordination-game environment (σ = −1) we find a distribution which is strongly peaked
near the i = N state. The asymmetry is due to the imbalanced payoff matrix used, such that
the basin of attraction for the i ' N state is much larger than for the i ' 0 state. For the
parameters chosen in the figure 5, the selection-balance point is at i∗ ≈ 18.
For equal switching rates, p+ = p−, the averaged stationary distribution ρi lies exactly in
between the two single-environment distributions. The effective distribution is approximately
uniform in the centre of the domain, with a lower probability of being found close to the domain
boundaries. This reflects the fact that for equal switching probabilities the effective game is
close to neutral, but frequent mutations push the population to the interior. The exact solution
[equation (6.2)] matches the features of the single-environment distributions, with a peak at
i ' N and at the coexistence point i∗. Interestingly, this solution also predicts a peak at the
i ' 0 state, a feature which is not seen in the single-environment distributions, or in the effective
distribution.
As seen in the main panel of figure 5(b), the exact solution is confirmed by simulations across
many orders of magnitude of switching probabilities. Any deviations can be attributed to incom-
plete equilibration of the measure used in equation (6.6). For large switching probabilities, the
effective stationary distribution, ρi,eff , matches the simulations. As expected the effective theory
becomes inaccurate for slow switching, roughly below pσ ' 10−2, in our example. The weighted-
average stationary distribution, ρi, shows the opposite behaviour. It is in reasonable agreement
with simulations for slow switching, but shows systematic deviations when the switching process
is too fast for the population to react adiabatically.
This picture is further corroborated by the data shown in the inset panels of figure 5(b). The
weighted-average and the effective distributions accurately predict the stationary distribution
obtained from simulations when the two switching rates are very disparate, i.e. p+  p−
or vice versa (top-left and bottom-right corners of the two insets). In these regions, the en-
vironment spends most of its time in one state, so that the model effectively reduces to the
single-environment case. Simulation data, the exact solution, and both approximations then all
collapse to the same result, the stationary distribution obtained in a single fixed environment.
The approach based on effective transition rates (right inset of figure 5(b)) is found to be accurate
over a large range of switching probabilities away from the slow-switching scenario. Conversely,
the weighted-average distribution (left inset of figure 5(b)) becomes increasingly accurate if the
dynamics of the environment is slow (pσ → 0).
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7 Summary and conclusion
The dynamics of a population evolving under changing environmental conditions is an important
concept in the study of bacterial populations. Previous work has focused on deterministic
analyses [5], or on an environment following a continuous stochastic process [30]. Here we have
taken a different route and assumed that the environment switches between discrete states. We
have developed the mathematical formalism to describe fixation properties in a general birth-
death process in an environment fluctuating between an arbitrary number of states. The main
results of this investigation are self-consistent expressions for the fixation probability of a mutant
in a fixed-size population, as well as for the mean unconditional and conditional fixation times.
For short-lived environments we put forward an approximation based on effective transition
probabilities.
As a specific application we discuss the fixation properties in the context of an evolutionary game
in a two-world scenario. The two states of the environment then correspond to two different
payoff matrices of the underlying games. Simulations confirm our exact solution over a wide
range of switching probabilities. The approximation based on effective transition probabilities
is seen to reproduce simulation data in the limit of fast switching.
Focussing on the case of switching between a coexistence game and a coordination game we
find unexpected non-trivial behaviour of the fixation probability of a single mutant. We observe
in our analytical results and in simulations that fixation can be more likely in a scenario in
which the fitness landscape switches between the two games than in either of the two constant
environments. We provide an intuitive explanation for this effect, and we have investigated in
detail the circumstances under which this phenomenon can occur.
Adding mutations to the dynamics removes the possibility of fixation, but introduces non-
trivial stationary states. We develop a method for the calculation of this distribution, along
with approximations for long-lived and short-lived environmental states respectively. These
approximations are shown to agree well with simulations in their respective limits.
The general theory developed here now allows further investigation of evolutionary dynamics
in time-varying environments. It provides a first mathematical characterisation of the effects
one may expect in such systems. The closed form self-consistent solutions will help to speed up
future studies, and they may remove the need for extensive computer simulations.
While our work is mainly mathematical, we think that our theory can be used to interpret
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existing experimental studies such as those studied by Acar et al. [6]. For some biological
systems it may be more appropriate to use constant selection in each environment, as opposed to
frequency-dependent selection. Our example of switching between coexistence and coordination
games was chosen to illustrate the theory. We have also seen such cases lead to unexpected
effects. We note that both types of game have been observed in systems of experimental evolution
[14, 51, 52]. We hope the formalism we have developed will be useful to analyse models closer
to other biological applications, and potentially to guide future experiments on evolutionary
systems in time-dependent environments.
On a more general level constructing a mathematical theory of evolutionary dynamics is very
much work in progress. An integral part of the evolution of microbes and higher organisms alike
is frequency-dependent selection. At the same time external factors determining the detailed
mechanics of selection may vary in time. In this work we have combined frequency-dependent
selection, fluctuating environments, and stochastic dynamics in finite populations into one model,
and we have provided the analytical tools for its analysis. This, we hope, is a contribution toward
a more complete understanding of evolutionary processes.
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